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Abstract: Tackling diffuse pollution from agriculture is a key challenge for governments seeking to
implement the European Union’s Water Framework Directive (WFD). In the research literature, how
best to integrate and align effective measures for tackling diffuse pollution, within the context of
the EU’s multilevel governance structure, remains an open question. This paper focuses on the first
and second implementation cycles of the WFD to explore how national governance arrangements
either facilitated or hindered the adoption of effective policies, especially with regards to the delivery
of agricultural and water policies on the ground. It draws on data collected through systematic
document analysis and interviews with key experts, policymakers and interest groups, and presents a
comparative analysis of two case studies: England and Scotland. The case studies show that Scotland’s
joined-up governance structure, which enabled policymakers and interest groups to work together
and to build trust and cooperation, facilitated the adoption of stricter measures for tackling diffuse
pollution. In contrast, in England institutional fragmentation prevented a meaningful engagement of
all parties and acted as a barrier. The analysis unpacks the design of policy mixes and the conditions
that allow national governments to pursue more holistic and integrated governance approaches to
overcome opposition from interest groups and gain their support.
Keywords: public policy; governance; WFD; Scotland; England
1. Introduction
Despite ambitious targets set in the EU by the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC, henceforth
WFD), to date few water bodies have achieved good water quality status [1]. The WFD aims to reshape
water management in Europe through the lens of sustainable development, meaning that it jointly
considers human health, economic activities and ecosystems, and thus moves away from previous
piecemeal European water legislation [2,3]. To achieve this goal, the WFD, which came into force in
2000, stipulated the aims that all EU water bodies should achieve good ecological and chemical status
by 2015, and that there should be no deterioration of water bodies [4]. It also set longer term deadlines
(2021 and 2027) through two further implementation cycles as well as mechanisms to account for
derogations and exemptions. However, EU countries have thus far failed to seize the opportunity
offered by the Directive to recast traditional water management in favour of more sustainable models,
and preferred business-as-usual approaches [5]. All sources of non-point and widespread pollution are
complex problems and constitute a major challenge for environmental regulators and policymakers;
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issues of diffuse pollution tend to be more costly to address and require a multitude of regulatory
approaches, as well as a degree of behavioural change among a high number of policymakers and
interest groups [6]. This paper draws on data from 25 in-depth interviews and detailed documentary
analysis to advance our understanding of this challenge in the context of the WFD by providing
an analysis of WFD implementation outcomes through a novel lens of institutional and governance
arrangements. It does so through a comparative analysis of two cases—Scotland and England—to offer
a situated explanation of the extent to which governance arrangements facilitated or obstructed the
adoption of more ambitious policy instruments. Despite manifest differences in physical geography
characteristics, pressures, and demographics, from this comparative analysis it is possible to draw
lessons that are applicable elsewhere and that could inform the next cycle of the Directive.
Previous EU water legislation was characterised by piecemeal approaches, which ”reduced
environmental systems into parameters without adequate assessment of the actual environmental
state”, and were, for this reason, not considered adequate to tackling water pollution ([7], p. 281). The
WFD and its ambitious environmental goals created the expectation among scholars and practitioners
that the future of water policy in Europe would see a paradigm shift towards more holistic and
integrated practice [5,8]. However, at the end of the first implementation cycle (2009–2015) the
assessment conducted by the European Commission (EC) of the River Basin Management Plans
(RBMPs) revealed that all governments across Europe were struggling to achieve good ecological
and chemical status [9]. With only 43% of water bodies on track to reach good status, the EC has
been concerned about the manifest inadequacy of the measures adopted by Member States to tackle
diffuse pollution from agriculture. Their disappointing performance was not limited to the first
implementation cycle, but has persisted, at the time of writing, through the course of the second cycle
(2021). The most recent report published by the European Environment Agency [10] confirmed that
still less than 50% of water bodies are in good ecological status and that agricultural diffuse pollution
(e.g., from nitrates and pesticides) remains the main pressure.
Our study brings together the EU public policy implementation literature and the literature
on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and provides an insight into the link between
governance structures, decision-making processes and the ambition of environmental policy outputs.
This paper focuses on the governance structures put in place by EU Member States (MSs) to show
how these were more or less conducive to effective policies to reduce diffuse pollution from nutrients
and pesticides, an issue that remains understudied [11]. We use the terms governance structures and
arrangements interchangeably to refer to the creation of institutions and the allocation of responsibilities
and resources to specific policy actors with decision-making powers linked to specific goals [12]. In the
context of EU environmental policies, national governance arrangements involve the interaction of
policymakers and policy actors at different institutional levels [13–15].
Crucially, in this regard, while MSs are free to choose their institutional approach and interventions,
the WFD text incorporated the key principle of integrated water resource management (IWRM), which
promotes a more effective approach to tackling diffuse pollution as one of the main pressures on
water quality [16–18]. This paper analyses the governance arrangements for implementing the WFD
and how these forms were tied to more holistic and integrated water management approaches and
environmental outcomes [19,20]. We conclude that the adoption of stricter regulatory measures
and general binding rules in Scotland was rooted in clearly structured and innovative governance
arrangements that allowed for intensive cooperation and joint decision making among key policy
actors [21]. By contrast, England did not modify its existing water governance arrangements to
implement the WFD [22]. In this case, a lack of shared responsibilities, together with less effective
stakeholder engagement practices, resulted in a political preference for voluntary approaches. These
were never going to capable of delivering significant improvements in water quality. Compared to
England, the Scottish case stands out for the direct involvement throughout the process of the Scottish
Government, which mandated a change in water governance structures. The new structures were
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required to facilitate effective cooperation, including on the part of the farming community and were
explicitly aimed at tackling diffuse pollution from agriculture.
The paper builds on traditional public policy and institutional analysis research that emphasises
the role of institutions in shaping the policy process, which in turn leads to the adoption of a certain
policy mix [23–27]. It is difficult to establish a definite link between the implementation of certain
policies and the environmental outcomes that we observe on the ground due to a multitude of variables
that can intervene throughout the policy process and affect it [28,29]. Due to these complexities, as
Cairney et al. observe, ‘studies of EU policymaking tend to focus on the large gap between intention
and action’ ([29], p. 15). Moreover, as pointed out in the editorial of this Special Issue, stricter policy
instruments are more conducive to better environmental outcomes [30] and, therefore, the adoption of a
mix of different types of interventions increases the likelihood of achieving policy goals. Consequently,
by understanding the pathways that lead policymakers to choose a certain policy mix, we can advance
our understanding of the barriers to successful policy implementation as well as the links between the
EU policy implementation theory and IWRM [11].
2. Analysing the WFD Implementation
The WFD implementation process has attracted scholars’ attention since its early stages [31–34].
The issue was studied from the perspective of various disciplinary fields [35,36] and with studies
overwhelmingly focusing on assessing specific aspects of the directive, such as public participation
processes in river basin management [37–44].
Among studies of the WFD implementation gap, one common approach is to point towards flaws
in the formulation of the WFD text itself [45,46]. Technical criticisms of its very ambitious goals, and of
a putative mismatch between the WFD’s demands and the feasibility of a response on the required
timescale, suggest the WFD’s environmental targets could never have been realistically achieved within
the timeframe [47,48]. Other authors have criticised technical aspects of the WFD and in particular
the one out-all out principle, which means that water bodies are classified based on the worst status
among the elements assessed, thus potentially leading to “pessimism bias” with regards to the overall
ecological status of water bodies [49,50]. The text of the WFD, which has been defined as a political
compromise [51], has also come in for criticism for the legal weakness of its environmental goals, which
are not strictly binding and allow governments to invoke exemptions, thereby permitting them to aim
at lower targets in the implementation phase [45].
Fully resolving the open academic debates on these various issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our starting point is instead the fact that, contrary to the original spirit of the WFD, member-states
have failed to take advantage of the opportunity to change water policies and did not implement a
mix of policies embodying a holistic and integrated water management approach [2,5,7]. In particular,
through the comparative analysis of two contrasting case studies, this paper looks at the pathways that
lead policymakers to choose a more or less ambitious policy mix. In this regard, it is useful to remember
that the WFD is not prescriptive in terms of governance approaches or with regards to individual
policy instruments [52]. This means that it allows MSs freedom of choice within its framework, and
indeed there is evidence of variations in the chosen approaches [53–56].
We acknowledge that there can be intervening factors that can affect policy implementation and
therefore their environmental outcomes [29]. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the editorial of this Special
Issue, stricter policy instruments are more conducive to better environmental outcomes; however,
these policies generally encounter more barriers to adoption and are more challenging to implement
because of opposition on the ground [6]. Our paper shows how national governments can overcome
this opposition and facilitate cooperation through appropriate governance structures.
2.1. Within-Country Implementation of EU Policies and Policy Mixes
Overall, we can identify three main waves in the understanding of the implementation gap within
EU public policy literature [57]. The progression between the first, second and third wave of EU
Water 2020, 12, 244 4 of 25
implementation studies has been towards a greater understanding of the role of actors (policymakers
and interest groups) in shaping policy outcomes.
The first wave emphasised legal, administrative and constitutional factors and saw implementation
as a rather apolitical process [58–60]. First-wave scholars were criticised for using fixed institutional
factors to explain changes at the policy-sector level [61] and tended not to differentiate between the
legal transposition of the directive into national legislation and the policy outcome. In reaction to
these criticisms, second wave scholars proposed explanations based on the idea of the degree of
policy fit/misfit (or the goodness-of-fit hypothesis), which is based on the assumption that if an EU
policy demands radical changes internally in terms of regulatory style or policy content, domestic
actors will resist implementation [62,63]. In spite of being theoretically appealing, the empirical
evidence in support of the goodness-of-fit hypothesis has been weak [64]. Finally, a third wave of EU
implementation studies has been increasingly concerned with the role of actors and domestic politics in
shaping policy outcomes [65–67]. This has opened up the space for more dynamic and context-specific
explanations that take into consideration internal dynamics linked to interest-maximisation, persuasion
and consensus, as well as the policy effects of exogenous events [68,69].
This paper departs from this literature to develop a novel and governance-specific focus on
the interaction between institutions and actors to explore implementation outcomes. It identifies
pathways linking governance arrangements to the adoption of effective policy mixes and a better
delivery of IWRM [26,29]. In particular, following the third wave, we highlight the role of interest
groups’ and policymakers’ behaviours in the implementation process. Unlike the third wave, however,
we also acknowledge that the organisational configuration and governance structures affect and alter
influence and behaviours, and they are therefore important factors to consider. This means that through
governance structures, policymakers can facilitate cooperation and gain the support of interest groups
that are initially reluctant to accept more ambitious regulatory interventions.
Based on this, we conduct our analysis using two conceptual building blocks. First, we see
institutions as non-neutral arenas that can constrain or enable policy actors who ultimately determine
the quality of an implementation process [70,71]. Second, we assume that governance structures
dynamically create windows of opportunity for policy actors to participate more or less effectively in
the policy process [61]. For instance, the allocation of clear responsibilities empowers policy actors to
have a stronger say in the decision-making while at the same time making them more accountable
and therefore more likely to comply. Similarly, policies can be co-designed with key interest groups
through intensive and meaningful engagement or, conversely, interest groups can be involved only
in the consultation stage, which is often too late to bring about meaningful change and consensus.
Through the identification of these windows of opportunity, and the observation of how policy actors
react and adapt their strategies to them, it is possible to establish a pathway between governance and
policy choices.
We build a multi-layered analytical framework to analyse country-level implementation of the
WFD, with the specific aim of linking different WFD governance arrangements to the adoption of more
or less ambitious policies to tackle agricultural diffuse pollution. Here, we focus on three key innovative
principles that characterize the WFD and that underpin the holistic approach to water management
advocated. These principles are: public participation; water management at the river basin scale; and
the need to consider the impact on water resources from all anthropic activities, especially (for the
purposes of this paper) agricultural production. Subsequently, we ground these principles within
the expectations derived and developed from the literature on EU policy implementation as outlined
above. From this literature, we derive three dimensions that underpin the analytical framework used
for the analysis of the empirical findings, namely cooperation, consistency and salience. The first
dimension stems from the acknowledgement that when implementing legislation, policymakers face
internal dynamics, such as interest-maximisation and conflicts between sectors, which in turn affects
policy outcomes. In this regard, the expectation from the literature is that if policymakers are able to
foster cooperation towards a common goal through careful institutional design, we should observe
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better quality policy outputs. The second dimension, consistency, indicates whether policymakers are
able to design governance arrangements that are fit for purpose and that avoid fragmentation. This is
a relevant dimension to consider in this analysis, given that the WFD required a stepwise change in
water management from a piecemeal approach towards a more holistic and integrated policy approach
(see above). The expectation here is that dedicated governance structures with appropriately allocated
responsibilities and competences between different policy actors can create conditions to overcome
fragmentation, avoid negative interactions or the duplication of efforts and promote IWRM [41]. Finally,
we argue that governance arrangements and decision-making are influenced by the broader political
context and, in this, policymakers have a responsibility to protect the policy salience of the WFD
vis-à-vis other societal challenges and political priorities, which we consider to be a key factor in the
adoption of ambitious policy measures.
The following sections discuss how the three dimensions in the analytical framework are
operationalised for the analysis of the empirical cases in more detail.
2.2. Cooperation
The first dimension that we consider is the degree of cooperation between governments or
responsible authorities and representatives from the agricultural sector, and the extent to which
policymakers put in place mechanisms to enhance this cooperation. When policymakers have to
implement a piece of legislation, they have to mediate the interests of various actors, each representing
a specific institution or organisation within the policymaking environment [72]. As the third-wave
EU implementation literature demonstrates, the influence of interest groups is key to explaining
implementation outcomes [66,67]. In order to achieve positive outcomes, interactions between
policymakers and interest groups should be based on cooperation and trust. The WFD acknowledges
this and advocates the principle of public participation in order to allow all interests to be considered
during policymaking [73,74]. We consider actors’ interests, in particular the extent to which they are
represented in the process, and how policymakers successfully achieve a synthesis between contrasting
priorities without compromising the adoption of effective policies [75]. In so doing, we do not assume
that everyone has equal power throughout the process. Rather, in line with our view of institutions as
non-neutral arenas, the way cooperation is structured empowers or disempowers certain policy actors.
There is a wide academic research that problematises public participation processes which points to the
fact that they often result in the exclusion of certain voices in favour of others [76–78]. Moreover, there
is no agreement on what form of public participation is the most effective and even within EU countries
the quality and the depth of public participation processes for the WFD vary substantially [44,79].
Therefore, national policymakers’ understanding and handling of interest groups’ power and the way
in which their influence unfolds is key and can enable (or conversely undermine) positive cooperation
towards achieving the WFD goals. For a positive outcome, we should expect policymakers to create the
conditions for a fair and open public participation process aimed at developing policies for achieving
good ecological and chemical status.
2.3. Consistency
The second aspect that we analyse is the consistency of governance arrangements with the
WFD requirements. In order to promote an integrated approach that would tackle all sources of
pollution affecting each water body regardless of administrative boundaries, the WFD required water
management to follow the river basin scale, thus introducing the physical geography dimension into
water policies [20]. Like in the case of public participation, the WFD does not prescribe what type
of governance arrangements governments had to set up in the implementation phase. These could
include formal or more informal structures to design and monitor the implementation of the river
basin management plans, and could include the creation of new river basin district authorities, steering
groups, or the allocation of competences on the basis of traditional administrative departments. In line
with our view that governance arrangements constitute non-neutral arenas, we expect that effective
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WFD governance will overcome administrative and policy fragmentation and political opposition.
Borrowing from the policy integration literature, mechanisms that could achieve this might include
a policymaking setting that allows for the explicit integration of agricultural policies with water
policies [80,81]. Crucially, this integration should be followed through with a clear allocation of
responsibilities and competences among key actors and an appropriate level of resourcing.
2.4. Salience
The final dimension that we analyse is the extent to which policymakers are able to keep the
WFD implementation high on the political agenda. The level of ambition can be affected by external
events, or critical junctures, as they change policymakers’ priorities with regards to problems and
solutions [69,82]. A paradigm shift in water governance needs strong support and ambition by
policymakers to move away from business-as-usual practices. However, because the implementation
of WFD policies do not happen in isolation from the broader context, the attention and commitment
that they receive is relative to other priorities and can change over time. Policy makers therefore have
to maintain the salience of the WFD to ensure that throughout the implementation process, ambitious
and effective policy-measures are adopted and enforced [23].
While the issue of political ambition could be explored from many different theoretical perspectives,
for the purpose of this paper we look at how governance arrangements led actors to prioritise the
likelihood that policies achieve the WFD environmental goal over other criteria (e.g., cost, or avoiding
resistance on the ground), and how policymakers maintain a relative prioritisation of water quality
over other contingent issues (e.g., policies of austerity following the 2008 financial crisis). Table 1
provides a summary of the dimensions that will be analysed and of the potential observations, while
Figure 1 provides a conceptual visualization of the analytical framework.
Table 1. A framework to analyse how governance arrangements influenced policy choices—specific to
diffuse pollution from agriculture.
Dimension Aspect to Analyse Potential Observation
Cooperation Extent to which governance arrangementsfacilitate cooperation between policy actors
• Cooperation between agricultural sector
and decision makers and/or
stated barriers
• Governance arrangements granting
more or less direct access to
decision-making process
Consistency
Consistency of governance arrangements
with the WFD requirements and with wider
institutions in countries
• Explicit integration and coordination of
agricultural policies
within implementation
• Responsibilities and competences
appropriately allocated and resourced
Salience Ability of governance arrangements tomaintain the WFD policy salience
• Explicit consideration of likelihood to
achieve environmental goal
in decision-making
• Relative prioritization of environmental
goal compared to other
societal challenges
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Table 2. Overview of the WFD implementation in the case settings.
Dimension England Scotland
Policy preference • Soft measures • General binding rules
Cooperation
• Conflicts between sectors not
well addressed
• Traditional public consultation methods
• Importance of engagement on the
ground recognised but not
adequately supported
• Positive institutional relations linked to
higher degree of acceptability
• High degree of trust between
interest groups
• Extensive and intensive engagement
Consistency
• No dedicated governance structures
• Inadequate resourcing
• Lack of explicit link between activities
and WFD goal
• Shared access to decision making
through National and Sub-National
Advisory Groups)
• Strong support to SEPA from the
Scottish Government.
• Clear allocation of responsibilities
and competencies
Salience
• Lack of leadership in
driving implementation
• Deregulatory agenda
• Support for austerity policies after 2008
global financial crisis
• Focus on business profitability
• Pioneering behaviour in
environmental policies
• Consistent political commitment
Data Collection and Analysis
The collection and analysis of the data for this article was part of a broader research project
conducted between 2012 and 2017, which received full ethical approval. Semi-structured interviews
with key informants in person or by phone were conducted between 2014 and 2016 at the EU level
and in the case studies—a total of 25 interviews. The interview process focused on a specific time
period in the history of the WFD, namely from 2000 to 2015, covering the adoption of the WFD until
the end of the first implementation cycle, to explore the establishment of governance arrangements
and structures. Participants were representative of a wide range of organisations to gather a variety of
perspectives and, where possible, more than one person for each organisation was approached and
interviewed to gather more insights into the implementation process (see Table A1 in Appendix A for
a coded list of interviews).
Documents were also used for triangulation purposes and extended to the second implementation
cycle. The data from the interviews and the documents was organised following research-driven
codes derived from the analytical approach and it was then analysed through qualitative content
analysis [86] (see Appendix B for a list of key documents). We coded the empirical data against a
coding framework directly derived from the analytical approach derived from the literature as set out
in Table A2 (Appendix A); after the formulation of the main codes, each participant was assigned an
ID to protect their anonymity and quotes were categorized based on the coding framework. Data was
coded manually to allow deeper contextualization of each quote [87,88]. The analytical process was
iterative, meaning that we refined our initial coding framework after initial analysis through abduction
and retroduction, and connections were identified by themes and codes [89]. In this paper, we used
process tracing to link and situate our findings within our analytical framework, thus ensuring the
construct validity of our research [84]. Process tracing can be used as analytical tool to identify causal
mechanisms and their interaction with the broader context [90,91]. Moreover, process tracing can be
used to examine whether the causal mechanisms that a theory implies are observed in the case setting.
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4. Implementation of the WFD in the Case Settings
When analyzing the WFD implementation with a focus on agricultural diffuse pollution in
England and Scotland, it is important to highlight that the two cases present different baselines and
geographical challenges. In 2018, the utilized agricultural area in England was 9 million hectares
(approximately 69% of the total area of England) and the total area of arable crops in England stood
at 3.9 million hectares [92]. The Scottish Government [93] reports that most of Scottish land is used
for agriculture (6.2 million hectares, 77% of Scotland), most of which is designated as Less Favoured
Area (LFA). Around 10% (574,000 hectares) of Scottish land is used for crops or fallow. The relative
size of the countries and economies must also be considered. Arable land accounts for 30% of total
landmass in England and 7% in Scotland but farming in Scotland contributes slightly more to Gross
Value Added (0.7% compared to 0.5% in England) and provides a greater proportion of jobs (2.5% of
employment in Scotland is in agriculture compared to 1.2% in England), creating different pressures
and opportunities for governments aiming to work with farmers in both settings [94].
The WDF was transposed into UK national legislation through the Water Environment (Water
Framework Directive) Regulations 2003 for England and Wales, and the Water Environment and
Water Services Act 2003 in Scotland (WEWS). Water governance in the UK is devolved to autonomous
governments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, whereas in England the UK government is
the responsible authority. At the strategic level, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra) is the UK government department responsible for water bodies, but the responsibility
for the production and implementation of the river basin management plans is placed on the national
Environment Agency (EA) in England and on the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in
Scotland, both non-departmental public bodies and environmental regulators. The agricultural sector
is represented by the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) in England, an association with over 300 branch
offices and by its equivalent (NFUS) in Scotland. The UK set up 15 river basin districts across the five
administrative areas—England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar.
Existing studies on the implementation of the WFD in the UK focused particularly on the
opportunities that the directive offered to innovate water governance and management through public
participation [35]. These studies generally linked increased public participation stemming from the
WFD implementation process to increased quality and increased acceptability of policy outputs [39–41],
while other contributions highlighted that important role of third sector River Trusts charities in
creating partnerships with the EA [95,96]. In general, studies conducted in England concluded that in
spite of attempts to try different and more bottom-up approaches, participatory experiences have been
highly variable [97] and, further, this potential had not been fully exploited [43,74,98,99]. In addition,
since 2013, the UK Government has attempted a Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) to foster active
stakeholder engagement and to strengthen existing and newly formed catchment partnerships [100].
However, the CaBA did not replaced public participation practices under the WFD and this policy
disconnect still remains to be addressed [43]. Studies that focused specifically on Scotland, tackled the
WFD implementation from an economic [101] and cost-benefit analysis perspective [102], the latter
concluding in favour of positive net social benefits resulting from the implementation of the WFD in
Scotland as a whole). In analyzing the Scottish RBMPs, Waylen et al. [103] provide a detailed analysis
of the working method of the advisory groups (which will be discussed more in detailed below)
and concluded that the more localized approach taken in Scotland increased stakeholders’ ability to
influence planning [79].
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is the need for more specific within-country
comparative studies that causally link WFD governance arrangements to the adoption of effective
measures to tackle diffuse pollution from agriculture. While public participation and stakeholder
engagement is one factor that influence policymaking, such analysis should consider more holistically
the effect on policymaking of the WFD governance arrangements as set out by national governments,
as well as the influence of political factors on such choices. The comparative analysis of England
and Scotland offered in this paper addresses this gap by identifying how country-specific factors
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contributed to creating the conditions for the adoption of different governance arrangements and how
this influenced the development of more or less ambitious policy mixes in England and Scotland.
4.1. England: Watering Down Regulation
4.1.1. Compliance with the WFD
England has seven river basin districts. Data on the ecological status of natural surface water
bodies indicates that in the first cycle (2009–2015) England struggled to make substantial progress
towards the environmental goal. Initially, Defra had estimated that 24% of surface water bodies would
be in good water status during the period 2009–2014. However, more recently Defra has recorded that
the number of surface water bodies in good or high ecological status has dropped by 33% and in 2017
only 16% were classified in good or high status [104]. Moreover, the percentage of water bodies in
poor ecological status increased between 2009 and 2017 from 12% to around 20%, resulting in England
violating the ban on non-deterioration, a fundamental and binding principle of the directive. England
is still far from achieving the WFD environmental goal and the second cycle of RBMPs showed little
change of ambition, with an unambitious increase to just 25% expected by 2021. The EA is currently
committed to achieving good water quality in 21% of the rivers, 19% of lakes, 53% of coastal waters
and in 25% of estuaries by 2021 and it has been recently recognised that it will be unlikely that the
WFD goal will be met even by the end of the third cycle [105].
4.1.2. Policy Approach
In England the Environment Agency (EA) manages the RBMPs and is supported in the delivery
phase by Natural England, the government’s advising body on the natural environment. The regulatory
and advisory bodies are tasked with liaising with the National Farmers’ Unions in England with raising
the awareness of individual farmers, and with delivering key programmes for the implementation of
the WFD aimed specifically at the agricultural sector.
Two main initiatives which are exemplificative of this approach are the Catchment Sensitive
Farming (CSF) and the Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme. These were set up in 2006 to address
diffuse pollution, as an experimental programme in 40 catchments (which corresponded to roughly 40%
of the country). The schemes are both run by Natural England, in partnership with the EA and Defra.
Catchment Sensitive Farming aims to raise awareness of diffuse water pollution from agriculture by
giving free training and advice to farmers in selected areas in England. The selected areas (priority
catchments) were those ‘where improvements in water quality will make the greatest contribution to
the Water Framework Directive objectives’ [106]. More recently, in 2018, the government launched a
new competitive grant scheme, the Water Environment Grant, to fund projects aimed at improving
the water environment in rural England. In order to be successful, the proposed projects must help
achieve the objective of the RBMPs. These schemes constitute voluntary measures that do not provide
for enforcement mechanisms and whose uptake is heavily dependent on the discretion of individuals.
4.1.3. Cooperation
Participatory approaches in England relied on existing consultation procedures and were neither
extensive nor intensive enough to build a true partnership based on trust between the regulator,
the farming sector and environmental NGOs. There was an attempt to create a UK-wide dedicated
governance structure through the creation of a technical and expert group (UKTAG) chaired by the EA
and composed of representatives of all environment and conservation agencies such as Natural England.
However, this organisation is mainly dedicated to providing technical advice; and other interest groups,
including agriculture or environmental NGOs are not part of it. The lack of true partnership was
lamented by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), a national Environmental NGO,
since the very early stages of the WFD implementation. The RSPB expressed concerns about the
fact that Defra was not being proactive in putting in place a process to get farming, industrial and
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environmental NGOs partners to work together. They warned that, in this way, the EA was not going
to ‘meet the environmental objectives of the WFD alone’ (2002). As pointed out to us, environmental
NGOs felt that the consultation process had been framed and set to a very low standard in order to
do the bare minimum and avoid infringement procedures (UK environmental NGO participant 1).
UKTAG regularly launched consultations (the latest one closed in May 2019), thus demonstrating an
understanding of the importance of engagement with interest groups but the traditional consultation
methods did not go far enough to reduce oppositions and create consensus.
4.1.4. Consistency
The limited scope and powers of UKTAG meant that the achievement of the WFD goal had to
rely on business as usual approaches rather than on a consistent commitment to develop integrated
water management approaches. Policymakers in England wanted to avoid farmers’ opposition and,
therefore, they avoided approaching them with a WFD-specific target: ‘You have to be very smart and
use a language that will interest farmers. You do not talk about targets, WFD, rules, regulations’, as
one interviewee from Natural England put it. This led to the adoption of soft measures and voluntary
schemes based on incentives such as the CSF and the CS described above, which accommodated
farmers’ opposition to binding regulation and one-size-fits-all solutions. Interview data shows that
the government perceived resistance from the agricultural sector on the ground to the introduction of
potentially new and more ambitious measures. However, their strategy of accommodation fuelled a
sense of frustration among those farmers who were more willing to comply, including among more
progressive and proactive farmers who felt unfairly treated and unrewarded by the government.
To ensure a good uptake of CSF and CS, Natural England carried out engagement activities with
individual farmers and tried to reach more remote farms, where late adopters are more likely to live
and work and where these initiatives would have a stronger impact. In the opinion of staff from
Natural England in delivering CSF or CS schemes on the ground, overcoming resistance and building
trust in those areas takes at least three years and requires a committed government strategy. However,
Natural England staff did not have adequate resources to engage with individual farmers and organise
one-to-one visits particularly in more remote areas (Natural England Participant 1). Natural England’s
resourcing and budget has been curtailed by more than half since 2008 and staff numbers have also
been reduced from more than 2500 in 2016 to an estimated 1500 in 2019 [107]. The uncertainty created
by continuous budget cuts undermined Natural England’s attempt to maintain consistency in their
work with the agricultural sector. As a result, Natural England were neither able to effectively raise
awareness or develop a sense of shared responsibility and trust with the agricultural sector, and even
the uptake of voluntary measures was undermined.
4.1.5. Salience
The slow progress in England has been the result of low ambition throughout the implementation
process and this can be linked to two factors. First, the rationale for setting up the national water quality
targets was disconnected from the WFD goal. Richard Benyon, MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State at Defra, declared that the UK’s ambition to reach 35% of water bodies in good status was
not a target to work towards to, but an estimation of the likely outcome with the measures that were
already in place [108]. In other words, policy choices were not determined on the basis of what was
best to achieve the WFD goal and instead were modelled on a business-as-usual approach. In England,
the government was not committed to achieving the WFD stated targets. Participants described the
WFD environmental goal as ‘aspirational’ and suggested that the achievement of moderate status was
even more desirable than good status: ‘In reality, the moderate status for certain things allow you to
balance what society wants and the environmental demand’ (senior participant from the Environment
Agency). The description of the environmental goal as aspirational, and therefore negotiable, was used
to water down measures to tackle diffuse pollution and avoid binding regulation that would have
delivered better results.
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Second, the adoption of soft measures was also coherent with the broader deregulatory agenda
pursued by the UK government since 2010 [109,110]. Deregulation was in some cases perceived by
participants as a sign of gradual political disengagement and unwillingness to commit the required
resources, rather than a way to achieve environmental goals more efficiently, as advocated by
deregulation proponents. Figure 2 illustrates this process.Water 2020, 12, x 12 of 24 
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4.2. Scotland: Joint Decision-Making
4.2.1. Compliance with the WFD
Scotland has two river basin districts (RBDs), one that falls entirely within the Scottish territory
(Scotland RBD) and one which is shared with England (Solway Tweed). In the first cycle (2009–2015)
the two Scottish RBDs expected an increase of 6.5 percentage points (pp) and 4.4pp (against an UK
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average of 2.5pp) in the number of water bodies with good global (ecological and chemical) status from
63.5% and 32.5% respectively. The better performance of the Scotland RBD has continued throughout
the second cycle and now SEPA expects a further increase of 6 percentage points (pp) and 16 pp by 2021
and 2027 respectively [112]. Differences in the baseline, physical geography and agricultural pressure
must be acknowledged when comparing Scotland to England. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
paper it is relevant that all the participants that were part of the WFD implementation in Scotland
expressed enthusiasm towards the working method adopted by Scottish Environmental Protection
Agency, which is elaborated on below.
4.2.2. Policy Approach
In terms of governance, the WFD falls under the Scottish Government’s devolved powers, which
enabled a substantially different approach than England to tackling water pollution from agriculture.
The Scottish approach stems from the view that a single integrated piece of regulation to implement
the WFD would have delivered better results while at the same time minimizing the administrative
and regulatory burden for business and productive activities. This is in line with the integrated water
management principles as advocated by the WFD.
Until the WFD came into force, water regulation in Scotland was limited to restrictions over
abstractions and control of point source discharges, but lacked a comprehensive regulation and control
over all other activities [113]. After the adoption of the 2003 Water Environment and Water Services
Act, the Scottish Government and SEPA laid out comprehensive Controlled Activities Regulations
based on three tiers of controls which tackled different scales of activities [113,114]. The three tiers are:
general binding rules to cover small risks to the water environment; registrations to control activities
for which the environmental impact is predictable and likely to have cumulative impacts; and licenses
to control greater risks to the water environment. This integrated regulatory framework ensures that
all activities that can cause an adverse effect on water are considered and regulated.
4.2.3. Cooperation
The Scottish approach to WFD was highly cooperative. Extensive engagement with interest
groups in public participation processes started quite early on (from 2001) and were retained in an
iterative nature throughout the implementation process. In addition to traditional formal consultation
methods, SEPA also organised intensive meetings and workshops, over a period of two years, where
representatives of each policy sector were at the same table discussing new regulations and licenses,
and were thus able to directly shape decisions and modify SEPA’s proposals (Scottish Government
2005). These discussions created support for the adoption of the regulatory framework and reduced
conflicts over binding measures through the development of trust between interest groups. Strong
relationships were maintained through the formation of National Advisory Groups by SEPA which
continuously engaged all key interest groups and provided a mechanisms to resolve conflicts arising
throughout the implementation process.
Moreover, in collaboration with professional organisations and farmers unions, the Scottish
government and SEPA worked with individual farmers to gain their trust and drive acceptability. This
continuous and consistent interaction meant that the relationship between SEPA and the National
Farmers Union Scotland was ‘positively transformed’ (UK SEPA participant 1). These government
stakeholder relations were facilitated by coordination between Scottish Government and SEPA: ‘We
have a more joined up approach [compared to England] and interest groups are getting the same
message, they see consistency—which is an important element of the Scottish approach (UK Scottish
government participant 2)’. Consistency was weaker in England, where some English farmers’ feared
that the initiatives of Natural England would be discontinued.
Stakeholder cooperation was further enhanced during the second cycle of RBMPs (2015–2021).
For this stage, SEPA developed interactive maps and tools to make data on pressures and water
quality more accessible and shareable, which interest groups and stakeholders found extremely
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useful [115]. Consultations for the second cycle showed that participants were supportive of a high
level of ambition and that ‘a slower progress would lose important momentum and partners may
become disengaged’ [116] (p. 9). Looking ahead, consultations have started for the third cycle and
participants have confirmed support towards a partnership approach and an even more integrated
approach, recognising the benefits of fully embedding RBMPs in land use planning and other plans
and strategies, such as forestry strategies and biodiversity strategies [115].
4.2.4. Consistency
Responsibility for enforcing the WFD was clearly established with the Scottish government giving
SEPA the authority to consistently implement substantial measures and the power to commit adequate
resources to the achievement of the WFD targets: ‘There wasn’t any baggage. People wanted to
make use of the opportunity. We had momentum. We were trying to deal with the whole picture
from the start’ (UK SEPA participant 3). Furthermore, the regulation guidance openly refers to the
WFD, in contrast with what happened in England, where links with the WFD objectives tended to
be downplayed.
In addition to enforcement, consistency was provided by the responsibilities and competencies
of other actors clearly being drawn out. This was done through establishing a Diffuse Pollution
Management Advisory Group (DPMAG). The DPMAG is composed of a wide range of interest
groups, including the National Farmer’s Union of Scotland, Scottish Water, SEPA, Scottish Government,
Scotland National Heritage. DPMAG developed a strategy to reduce diffuse pollution based on a
national campaign, a national engagement programme and a targeted approach focused on 14 priority
catchments and focus areas [117]. Within DPMAG, the allocation of responsibilities is clear: for
instance, while SEPA and the Scotland’s Rural College (SRUC) are in charge of carrying out the national
campaign, NFUS and Scottish Land & Estates (SLE) support them on how to best engage with the
agricultural sector, while Scottish Natural Heritage carries out inspections where appropriate. The plan
underscores the importance of partnership and recognises that while the responsibilities are assigned
on an individual basis, the achievement of the RBPMs is ‘a shared goal for Scottish Government, SEPA,
Scottish Natural Heritage, Scottish Water, Forestry Commission Scotland, responsible authorities and
sector responsibilities’. This approach explicitly assigned responsibility, and therefore accountability,
to all actors in each sector. As observed by a participant from Scottish Water, they could not ignore this
commitment, ‘we had to participate’.
Moreover, a degree of consistency in the implementation of the WFD was promoted through a
consistent approach to resolving conflicts between interest groups, including those regarding cost
and technical feasibility issues. The Scottish Government and SEPA understood that to facilitate
implementation and make sure that farmers were on board, clarity and consistency would act as a
proxy for their own political commitment. During the joint group sessions, SEPA extensively used
data and evidence to establish a common understanding of the status of the environment and on the
level of commitment required to reduce water pollution, which helped them to overcome cognitive
conflicts and different perceptions. Scientific and photographic evidence of breaches and polluting
practices was brought up during meetings to convince the farming sector that diffuse pollution from
agriculture was the main polluting source. The specificity and the relevance of the evidence used was
a crucial factor to get all the sectors on board (SEPA participant). In the view of a participant from an
English NGO, the Scottish government’s commitment was crucial to convincing farmers that accepting
binding regulation was necessary to protect the future sustainability of their land.
4.2.5. Salience
In many ways, Scotland sees itself as a pioneer in environmental policy [118]. This ambition was
reflected in the integrated approach taken in Scotland vis-à-vis the WFD, including the facilitation of a
more cooperative and consistent implementation strategy, and the greater saliency of the directive
compared to in England. The Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Scottish
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Government were clear from the outset that they would adopt a strict regulatory approach. SEPA
engages with farmers and land managers to raise awareness and to conduct an audit on the ground.
Based on the results of the individual audits, SEPA requires farmers and land manager to adopt
measures to reduce polluting activities (e.g., maintaining field drains, licensing, tackling point source
discharges, etc.). In some cases, land managers would receive further support for example through
nutrient budgeting. Any cases of non-compliance identified during an initial visit would be addressed
through subsequent revisits, followed by fixed monetary penalties (FMP) if non-compliance persisted.
At the end of the first cycle, SEPA reported that they visited all 14 priority catchments and conducted
3215 initial visits to farms. The initial visits revealed a compliance rate of 34%. After 1667 revisits, 85%
of the farms showed a positive response and at the end of another round of revisits, 98% of farmers
carried out the required actions [119]. The work for the second cycle started in July 2016 with on the
ground visits starting in November 2016. Figure 3 provides an overview of this process.
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5. Discussion and Conclusions: Managing Barriers and Creating Enablers
This paper has demonstrated how different governance arrangements that England and Scotland
have put in place to implement the WFD have brought about different approaches to tackling diffuse
pollution from agriculture. In both cases a range of factors meant farmers were critical to the successful
implementation of the WFD. However, governance arrangements established different forms of
engagement, with different levels of success. Differences in the physical geography settings (arable
farming is a more prevalent use of land in England) and the consequent importance of the agricultural
sector presented additional challenges. This required a more decisive and cooperative approach from
Defra and the EA in England to build consensus and fully engage with stakeholders [43]. The farming
sector is hugely significant for Scotland: more than 70% of land is used for agriculture and much of
this land is designated as LFA. The sector contributes more to Scotland’s Gross Value Added (GVA)
than in England meaning the farming community are an important stakeholder base for the Scottish
government. Through the comparison between the English and Scottish governance arrangements,
this paper contributes to understanding the conditions under which the latter were more conducive
to the adoption of stricter, more ambitious and more effective interventions. Our empirical findings
contribute to the debate on the WFD governance issues with specific regards to tackling diffuse
pollution, as set out in the editorial of this Special Issue. In particular, it tackles specifically the three key
challenges that have been identified, namely the fragmentation and the distribution of responsibilities
and competencies, while also touching on the issue of the contested use of knowledge-for-policy. We
tackled the second challenge only indirectly, by showing that consistent governance, cooperation and
policy salience can promote the use of evidence as a driver for action, and by outlining the mechanisms
through which contested claims are resolved through transparent and open discussion, such as in
the case of the Scottish advisory groups. With regards to the first challenge, our findings point to the
beneficial role that dedicated organizational structure can play in delivering effective policy mixes.
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Building on a combined reading of the literatures on EU policy implementation and on the
WFD specifically, we identified three dimensions—cooperation, consistency and salience—of WFD
national-level governance with important implications for outcomes on the ground. National
governments can design effective governance structures that enable all interest groups to have
a say and to meaningfully take part in decision-making. Such structures require a clear allocation
of responsibilities and direct engagement with interest groups. If such arrangements are in place,
farmers are more likely to cooperate as they expect stricter regulation from the government and
enforcement measures are perceived as inevitable. In this case, interest groups are more willing to be a
constructive part of the decision-making process and to compromise in favour of long-term benefits
and sustainability, especially if they see the decision-making process as a genuine opportunity to
influence policy outputs. While different and innovative governance arrangements such as the CaBA
have been tried in the UK, so far there is mixed or limited evidence that they have contributed to
reducing diffuse pollution [43]. Published research findings in this regards are also in line with our
own interview findings, as participants did not mention CaBA when discussing WFD implementation
and diffuse pollution from agriculture. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity in the UK to address
the policy disconnect that exists between the CaBA and the WFD, thus giving the catchment-based
groups more power to influence future RBMPs and to implement a more bottom-up approach to
water governance [38,99,100]. This is in line with recent studies that have identified pathways to
improve participation in water governance. Yet, our contribution showed that in order to be successful,
participation should happen within the context of governance that enables cooperation, balanced access
to decision making and consistency. In this context, we stressed the pivotal role that central national
governments play in creating the right conditions. The adoption of stricter regulatory measures
also reflects the ambition of governments as well as their ability to build consensus and overcome
barriers and opposition. The comparative analysis of England and Scotland focusing on cooperation,
consistency and salience illuminates this.
The way England went about setting its targets under the WFD was flawed from the outset. The
government prioritised farmers’ interests, and thus avoided the adoption of strict regulatory measures
for the entire first cycle, with predictably disappointing results. The lack of ambition in delivering the
WFD undermined regulators’ chances of engaging farmers in developing consistent policies to reduce
pollution and to build a relationship based on trust [43].
Furthermore, more recently, Defra and the EA have introduced new regulation with more binding
requirements that should be in place by the 2021, in time for the third cycle of RBMPs. Despite this shift
in favour of stricter regulation to reduce diffuse pollution from agriculture, the focus and the discourse
in England remains centred on business interests and ‘win-win’ and, more recently, the government
has also highlighted farmers’ central role in delivering a Green Brexit. However, there is no evidence
that this shift will bring about more alignment between the RBMPs and agricultural policies, given that
this shift has not happened on the back of a consistent effort to increase the acceptability of regulatory
measures among individual farmers. Therefore, in our view it is unlikely that these changes will result
in the achievement of the WFD environmental goal by 2021 and possibly even by 2027 [105]—that is if
the WFD remains relevant in a post-Brexit England.
By contrast, the Scottish Government consistently engaged with interest groups and stakeholders,
and distributed responsibilities and accountabilities in a way that enabled trust and cooperation, as
well as demonstrating commitment and maintaining the salience of the issue. Adding to the findings
by Waylen et al. [11,103], we found that, in Scotland, more localized and purposive governance
arrangements that were consistent with the requirements of the WFD, enabled cooperation between
policy actors as a result of a more balanced access to power and more clearly allocated responsibilities
and competences. The proactive intervention of the government and regulators in ensuring a fair and
meaningful access to the decision-making process was critical in shaping the resulting policy mix.
This level of engagement and the shared responsibilities created a sense of ‘ownership’ of the WFD
implementation. This sense of ownership fostered solidarity and consensus among policymakers and
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interest groups that determined a ‘race to the top’ [118]. The focus of the Scottish approach to date
remains on fostering partnership and cooperation and overcoming issues that are still of concern, such
as the management of anaerobic digestate, and new issues that have been identified, such as plastic
pollution in rivers. While progress in Scotland has been promising so far, it is important to note that
the country faces challenges in the second and third cycle, particularly with regards to dealing with
hydro-morphological pressures, as well as an increasingly volatile political context.
Table 2 provides a summary of the empirical findings in light of the analytical approach. In
applying the analytical approach to the case studies, we have considered institutions and governance
structures as potential barriers or enablers to effective policy mixes, rather than explanatory factors
itself [61]. In so doing, this paper has reconciled studies that emphasise the role of institutions in
driving successful implementation and studies that, instead, focus much more on the role of individual
actors. Here, instead, we have broken down the statement that institutions and governance structures
matter to identify the mechanisms through which governance choices influence the policy process and
influence actors and the effectiveness of their strategies and priorities.
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Appendix A List of Interviews and Coding Framework
Table A1. List of Interviews.
Level/Country Organisation and Reference in the Paper
EU (Brussels)
EU Farming participant
EU environmental NGO participant
EU utility participant
EC participant 1 & 2 (DG Environment and DG Agri)
England
Natural England participant 1, 2 & 3
UK Utility participant 1 & 2
UK Farming participant
UK Consumer association participant
Environment Agency (EA) participant 1 & 2
UK environmental NGO participant 1, 2 & 3
Scotland
Scotland Farming participant
Scotland utility participant 1 & 2
Scottish Government participant 1 & 2
SEPA participant 1, 2 & 3
Table A2. Coding framework.
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Appendix B Key Documents
• Commission Report (COM (2009) 156 (final): “Report from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council in accordance with Article 18.3 of the Water
Framework Directive 2000/60/EC on programmes for monitoring of water status” [accessed
from https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2c2027b9-2402-437c-a5cc-
cb6ec28ed637/language-en]
• Commission Report (COM (2009) 156 (final): “Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council in accordance with Article 18.3 of the Water Framework Directive
2000/60/EC on programmes for monitoring of water status”
• Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the
Water Framework Directive—River Basin Management Plans (COM (2012) 670 of 14/11/2012)
• Commission Staff Working Document—Member State Italy—Accompanying the document Report
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the
Water Framework Directive 2000/60/CE River Basin Management Plans COM (2012) 670 final
• Commission Staff Working Document—Member State United Kingdom—Accompanying the
document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Implementation of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/CE River Basin Management Plans
COM (2012) 670 final
• Commission Staff Working Document (SEC (2009) 415)—Appendix 2 [accessed from http://ec.
europa.eu/environment/archives/water/implrep2007/pdf/sec_2009_415_en.pdf]
• Common Implementation Strategy guidance documents availa5ble at http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/water/water-framework/objectives/implementation_en.htm
• Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—Towards
sustainable water management in the European Union—First stage in the implementation of the
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